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I. Introduction
Over the last few years, a great deal has been written about time-varying retail pricing of electricity. Many authors, myself included, have argued that real-time retail electricity pricing (RTP) -retail prices that change very frequently, e.g., hourly, to reflect changes in the market's supply/demand balance -is a critical component of an efficient restructured electricity market. During the California electricity crisis in 2000 -2001 pointed out the value of RTP in reducing the ability of sellers to exercise market power.
While nearly all economists have supported RTP, large-scale adoption has been slowed by at least three factors: cost of real-time metering and billing, large potential wealth transfers among customers due to RTP, and the potential volatility of bills that customers could face.
The metering and billing costs, while possibly a serious issue for smaller customers,
are minor compared to the potential benefits of moving larger customers to RTP, as I have shown in Borenstein (2005) . 2 In Borenstein (2006), I addressed the potential level of transfers among larger customers due to RTP. I found significant potential transfers and that more than half of all customers could be worse off, even compared with time-of-use pricing (a simple peak/off-peak pricing system). The transfers, however, can be greatly mitigated through a two-part RTP program that gives incumbent customers the right to buy their past load levels at regulated prices, but still charges/refunds at the real-time energy price for their deviations from that level.
The third area of concern one frequently hears about RTP is the possible volatility of costs to the end-use customer. This is often expressed as concern about the cost the customer would face for electricity consumed during an hour in which prices hit an extreme spike, such as $10,000/MWh. Two factors should reduce these concerns. First, customers almost certainly care about volatility of their payments, which are typically on a monthly or longer cycle, not the volatility of their hourly incurred liability. Second, in most RTP implementations, there is some opportunity for the customer to buy fixed-quantity, fixed-price contracts in advance to cover some of their demand, and then pay/receive the realtime price for deviations from the contracted quantity. In this paper, I address the question of how much bill volatility is caused by RTP and the extent to which hedging in advance, by purchasing forward contracts, might reduce that volatility.
The concern about volatility is somewhat puzzling to hear from large corporations for whom electricity makes up a very small share of expenses. One might think that this sort of risk could be easily absorbed by such customers. There are a number of possible explanations, though none is entirely satisfying. One is that electricity may be only one or two percent of total expenses, but could still be equal to the entire profit margin of the firm, so the proportional effect on profits could be much more significant. Pressure from equity and debt holders could cause the firm to be squeamish about even short-term profit
fluctuations.
3 A second explanation is organizational. For whomever within the firm is responsible for energy costs, this could be a large component of his or her responsibilities, so a sudden dramatic increase in costs could have significant career implications. A third explanation may be simply a cost/benefit analysis in which the customer sees tangible costs from increased complexity and risk, but doesn't understand the potential benefits. 4 In any case, bill risk is nearly always raised by opponents of RTP among even large customers, so it seems worth trying to estimate the size of that risk and consider how it might be mitigated.
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The issue of electricity bill volatility from RTP should also be considered in the context of the volatility that customers already face due to electricity consumption variation under historical pricing schemes. Even with a flat-rate tariff, a customer's bill will vary due to consumption variation. Under a time-of-use (TOU) tariff -a simple peak/off-peak pricing scheme -there will be more bill volatility for most customers due to higher prices in the peak hours of the peak months. From these comparison points, I examine how much RTP further increases bill volatility and how much that increase is mitigated by hedging.
The data I use for this analysis cover 1142 large industrial and commercial customers of Pacific Gas & Electric during 2000 through 2003. 6 I combine these customer consumption patterns with actual and simulated prices (based on data from the California Independent System Operator), as described in the next section, to determine the customers' bills under flat-rate, time-of-use, and real-time retail pricing programs, where retail rates are set in all cases to cover the full wholesale cost of the power. From these monthly bills, I calculate measures of monthly bill volatility for each customer.
Then I recalculate the customer bills and bill volatility under the assumption that they have engaged in actuarially-neutral hedging contracts. By construction, the aggregate of all customer bills over the entire sample period is the same in all of these scenarios, but the monthly bill volatility of individual customers varies substantially. I show that while changing from flat-rate or TOU to RTP tariffs increases customer average bill volatility by two to four times, simple hedging strategies eliminate the vast majority of that volatility.
I conclude that bill volatility should not be a significant impediment to implementation of a well-designed RTP program, but that hedging instruments are likely to be important to building customer acceptance.
I then explore the levels of hedging in which a customer could engage. A simple example illustrates the intuition that if price is positively correlated with a customer's time when the price has spiked.
consumption quantity, hedging more than expected quantity can reduce bill volatility by more than hedging just the expected quantity. In fact, I show that such "over-hedging"
can reduce volatility to below the level faced by a customer subject to a flat-rate tariff. I evaluate the empirical importance of this result by examining the effect of various levels of over-hedging on the bill volatility of the observed customers.
II. Consumption and Pricing Data
The analysis is based on a sample of 1142 large industrial and commercial customers of Pacific Gas & Electric company, which has a service territory that covers most of northern California, during the period 2000-2003. All of the customers are in the sample for the entire period. With these data, it is straightforward to construct a customer's monthly bills by combining the quantity data with any given price series for the same time period.
By constructing the customer bill this way, I am assuming zero price-elasticity of the customer's demand. Customer price elasticity would reduce the bill volatility induced by RTP, because customers would respond to the higher-priced hours by consuming less.
Thus, assuming no such elasticity biases the calculation in the direction of finding a larger impact of RTP on bill volatility.
I carried out the calculations using three different wholesale price scenarios. The first is the actual wholesale spot prices that were observed in the control area of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) for northern California during the observed time period. The other two are based on a long-run breakeven wholesale price simulation that uses the CAISO's actual load during the sample period. In all three scenarios, I assume that the retail real-time prices customers face are equal to the wholesale prices plus $40/MWh for transmission and distribution (T&D).
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The simulation model, which is described in detail in Borenstein (2005) , establishes 7 This is a fairly typical assumption for T&D costs. In a more sophisticated implementation of RTP, the T&D charge would also be subject to real-time variation that reflects congestion, but that is not part of most current or planned RTP programs. Most utilities impose a charge related to distribution capacity, called a demand charge, that is based on the customer's peak usage during a billing period regardless of when that peak usage occurs.
a long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium in capacity and wholesale prices for a given demand profile (load duration curve), assumed demand elasticity, and costs of different types of production capacity. The data used for generating the wholesale price series for this paper are not exactly the same as in Borenstein (2005) . First, I use different cost data than those in the earlier paper, reflecting changes in capital and fuel costs since that paper was written. fornia electricity crisis. The latter was a period in which the state was widely viewed as having significant excess capacity, so prices remained low. These wholesale prices generally were viewed as too low to support generation investment. 9 The actual prices also include hours in which the real-time wholesale price was negative, which can occur due to non-convexities in the production process and the fact that electricity generated cannot
5
The simulation model assures that generators cover their variable plus amortized fixed costs during the sample period. The simulation is of an energy-only revenue model; there are no separate capacity payments. Thus, fixed cost recovery occurs during the highestdemand hours when price exceeds the variable cost of even the most costly generation units.
The two simulated scenarios differ in the degree of demand elasticity that withinmarket producers are assumed to face. Demand elasticity may come about from actual end-user adjustments, but it can also come from import supply elasticity or the system operator utilizing out-of-market resources to provide supply if the market prices rises high enough. With extremely inelastic demand, the simulated market equilibrium includes a very small number of hours in which prices are extremely high. These hours produce the net revenues (scarcity rents) necessary for peaker generation units to cover their amortized fixed costs. With somewhat greater demand elasticity, the long-run equilibrium involves the peaker generators collecting scarcity rents over more hours, but a lower level of scarcity rents and a lower wholesale price in any one of those hours. In scenario I, I assume that the demand elasticity faced by within-market producers is -0.025. In scenario II, I assume an elasticity of -0.1. 10 Summary statistics for the three wholesale price scenarios are presented in table 1. 11 I focus primarily on the analysis of results from scenario I simulated prices, because this is the sort of scenario under which bill volatility from RTP would be of the greatest concern.
With these prices and customer consumption quantities, I can then calculate each customer's monthly bill under RTP for each month it is in the sample. I then divide each bill by the number of hours in the month in order to eliminate variation due to varying always be disposed of costlessly. In order to compare bill volatility under RTP with the alternatives, I also need to create a flat-rate tariff and a time-of-use (TOU) tariff to use in calculating the monthly 12 I drop nearly all hours in which the consumption is reported as exactly zero. For those in which the adjacent hours on each side are present (a single missing hour) and are of typical level for the customer, I interpolate the missing data. For many hours or days in a row of zero readings, I set these observations to missing and calculation the "monthly bill" based only on the remaining hours. These are either meter failures or complete power shutoffs, which could be due to on-site generation, plant shut-down, or other causes. Including these zeros -which are not common in the samplemakes very little quantitative difference to the results and does not change any of the qualitative findings.
7 bills for the observed customers. I do this by continuing to assume no demand elasticity on the part of the observed customers and calculating the prices that would cover the costs of the observed group of customers as if they were a distinct tariff class.
For the flat-rate tariff, this is completely straightforward: I calculate the total revenue that would be required to purchase the consumption of the observed customers in the wholesale market over the 48-month period (using each of the wholesale price series discussed above) and then divided that revenue requirement by the aggregate consumption of these customers over the 48-months. This yielded a flat-rate tariff that generated sufficient revenues to purchase the power demanded by this group.
To create a TOU tariff requires first that one determine the different rate periods.
I use nearly the same rate periods that PG&E used in its standard TOU tariffs during the observed time period. There are two periods during the "winter" months, in effect November through April: the peak rate is in effect from 8am to 10pm on non-holiday weekdays and the off-peak rate is in effect at all other times. Summer rates, which cover May through October, have three components: Peak period is noon-6pm on non-holiday weekdays; Shoulder period is 8am-noon and 6pm-10pm on non-holiday weekdays, and off-peak is all other times.
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Creation of a TOU tariff is less straightforward than the flat-rate because for a given demand history there are an infinite number of tariffs that would cover the total wholesale power costs. A natural TOU tariff would be for the rate within each of the five TOU periods to be set to exactly cover the wholesale power procurement costs for that period,
i.e., no cross-subsidy across TOU periods. I use that as one basis of analysis, but the TOU tariff that results from this calculation exhibits much larger peak to off-peak rate differences than have historically been utilized by PG&E or most other regulated utilities.
After adding a $40/MWh charge for transmission and distribution, the ratio of the highest 13 In the four-year period I study, the number of hours each rate is in effect are: winter off-peak, 10,512 hours; winter peak, 6,888 hours; summer off-peak, 10,440 hours; summer shoulder, 4128 hours; summer peak, 3096 hours. The actual tariff rate changes at 8:30am, but I have altered that because the data are aggregated to the hour level. Similarly, the evening change occurs at 9:30pm, but I've altered that to 10pm.
8 TOU-period prices to the lowest would be 3.11 (using the scenario I real-time prices), while the same figure for PG&E's standard TOU rate is 1.91. Thus, this constructed TOU tariff, which I refer to as "cost-based TOU," is economically appealing, but it would yield more volatile bills than are likely to occur under actual TOU tariffs.
To address this, I also create a TOU tariff that mimics the inter-period rate ratios that existed under the standard TOU tariff that PG&E offered during the sample period.
To construct this tariff, I calculated the ratios between the rates in the PG&E tariff for the five periods. I then adjusted all of the TOU rates together, maintaining these ratios, until the resulting revenue covered the wholesale procurement costs of all power consumed by the observed customers in aggregate. I refer to this as "fixed-ratio TOU." The resulting flat-rate and TOU tariffs, along with summary statistics of the RTP prices, are shown in table 1.
By assuming throughout these rate calculations that all of the observed customers exhibit zero price elasticity, I am implicitly assuming that moving these customers to RTP does not further dampen wholesale price volatility. That price dampening effect must instead be recognized in evaluating the results of the exercise. It suggests that the extremely volatile price scenario, scenario I, is less likely to occur once some customers are on RTP.
Finally, comparing a customer's bill volatility under different pricing and hedging regimes requires a measure of volatility. Because the customer's concern is with risk, I
assume that predictable monthly variation is not at issue. Thus, I measure the "unexpected deviation" component of the bill as the difference between the actual monthly bill and the customer's average bill for that month of the year. I use two measures of bill risk. The first I refer to as a "coefficient of deviation", which is the standard deviation of the customer's monthly unexpected bill deviation divided by the mean of the customer's monthly bill.
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The second is an attempt to capture some customers' concerns about extreme events, particularly bill spikes when the wholesale price increases drastically for a short period.
The second measure, which I refer to as the "coefficient of maximum deviation" is the customer's maximum monthly unexpected bill deviation over the sample period divided by its mean monthly bill.
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III. Bill Volatility with No Hedging Table 2 presents the measures of bill volatility under the four tariff regimes -flat-rate tariff, cost-based TOU, fixed-ratio TOU and RTP -for wholesale price scenario I, the most volatile wholesale prices. Results for the two other wholesale price scenarios are presented in the Appendix. As noted, one would expect to observe bill volatility even absent timevarying prices due to consumption variation. This is reflected in the variation under a flat-rate tariff. Indeed, the left-hand column indicates that under the flat-rate tariff the average customer coefficient of deviation is 0.155. The volatility is almost exactly the same under either TOU pricing plan. While prices are more volatile under these plans, the differences are captured in the predictable seasonal variation. This is not surprising in that the prices are, by construction, identical across years for a given month. Because the coefficient of deviation is bounded below at zero, the distribution is highly skewed. The median variation is about half the mean.
Bill volatility under RTP is, however, many times greater than under the other billing arrangements. The mean volatility is more than double and the median is about four times greater than under the alternatives.
The table presents the statistics on the full distribution of customer bill volatilities, indicating that there are some customers with extremely high volatility. The fact that this results even with a flat-rate tariff indicates that this bill-volatility is a result of large 15 Using a monthly seasonal adjustment with only four years of data suggests that a degrees of freedom correction should be applied to all estimates of standard deviations, multiplying the sample statistic by 4/3 to correct for the fact that the mean is calculated from the same data. Such a correction would, of course, make no difference to the comparisons of volatility across pricing regimes. A similar correction to the coefficients of maximum deviation, however, is less clear since these are essentially order statistics. To maintain some comparability between the two measures, I have not performed a degrees of freedom correction on either. fixed-ratio TOU (TOU-F). Consistent with the first panel, the median customer sees its bill volatility increase by more than four times. For more than ten percent of the sample, bill volatility is at least eight times higher under RTP than under TOU-F.
While the coefficient of deviation is a good measure of overall volatility, what many customers seem to be concerned about is the outlier event, when they are hit with a huge unanticipated bill spike. I attempt to capture than in table 3. Table 3 has the same structure as table 2 except it presents the coefficient of maximum deviation, the ratio of a customer's maximum bill deviation (from it's seasonally-adjusted expectation) in the sample to its average bill. Table 3 confirms that there is very little variation in unanticipated bill costs among flat rates, fixed-ratio TOU and cost-based TOU, but RTP opens up much more possibility for bill shock from a single month. In this sample of 1142 customers, the coefficient of maximum deviation averages between 30% and 35% under flat rate or TOU. But the coefficient of maximum deviation under RTP is on average more than 150%, suggesting that a typical customer would at some time during this sample receive a bill that is more than two and a half times the expected level. For more than 10% of the sample the largest unexpected bill differential would cause more than a tripling of the bill.
These analyses confirm that real-time pricing without hedging could significantly increase customer bill volatility, at least if wholesale prices are quite volatile. As mentioned earlier, this wholesale price volatility is probably greater than would obtain if a significant number of customers were on RTP. Still, the volatility increase could very well be sufficient to cause substantial unease among some customers.
IV. Bill Volatility with Simple Hedging
Because of the potential for large unexpected bills under RTP, those utilities that offer or require an RTP plan for some customers usually also offer a hedging option. The hedging program allows the customer to purchase some of its power months in advance at a less-volatile expected price. These programs are often used as inducements by setting the hedge price below the expected spot price, thereby combining a hedging program with a transfer, which is often done to compensate the customer for the loss of a cross-subsidy it was receiving under conventional billing. 16 The analysis here does not encompass this aspect of long-term power purchases; instead I set hedging prices to be actuarially fair.
I implement this not on a forward-looking probabilistic basis, but simply by setting the price of the hedge equal to the unweighted average price during the hours that it covers in the sample.
The hedging products that I examine here are modeled after structures in some of the RTP hedge programs: different products for peak and off-peak periods. For simplicity, I
model five hedge products that correspond to the five TOU periods over the year: a peak and an off-peak product during the winter, and a peak, shoulder and off-peak product during the summer. The product itself is defined as purchase of one unit of power during each of the hours in the sample that falls under the specified TOU period. The price of the hedge, per MWh, is the unweighted average price of power during the hours covered. To prices with table 1 reveals that they are closer to cost-based TOU than to fixed-ratio TOU, but they are a bit more compressed than TOU-C. The reason is that the hedge prices are unweighted averages of the wholesale prices while the TOU-C prices are weighted averages in order to recover the full wholesale cost. These are still breakeven hedge prices, because the hedge product is for the same quantity (one MWh) in all hours within the period.
These are obviously not very sophisticated hedge products. Hedges could potentially be offered and priced for even individual hours at some expected cost for that specific hour. Without resorting to a forecasting model, I can't mimic that process. Instead, I'm using a broad hedging product based on the average prices over a long time span, the 4 year sample period. Because the wholesale price simulations generate different prices only due to demand variation, this approach approximates the distribution of prices a customer might anticipate in the spot market going into a period, before information about abnormal demand (or supply) is revealed.
To examine the magnitude of bill volatility under RTP with hedging, I also need to determine the quantity of power purchased as part of the hedge. Here again I take a very simple approach. The quantity that a customer purchases is assumed to be the customer's naive expected consumption in all hours to which the hedge product applies. For example, for all hours that belong to the Summer-Peak TOU period, the customer purchases the same hedge quantity and that quantity is the customer's average consumption during Summer-Peak TOU hours during the 4-year sample period. In an actual implementation, the customer could almost certainly do better than this in predicting it's consumption for, for instance, a given summer period. The customer might know if it is ramping up its own production or closing most of the operations for some period of time. Thus, this approach is likely to underestimate the risk reduction from hedging.
A customer on RTP who hedges is assumed to have a power cost for hour t that is 14 in TOU period h equal to Cost t =q h · P h + (q t −q h ) · P RT P t , whereq h is the customer's average consumption during hours in that TOU period and P h is the hedge price of a MWh of power during that TOU period. From these hourly power costs, the customer's monthly bill (actually hourly average bill during the month, as explained earlier) is created for each month and, just as in the previous section, the deviation from expected cost, conditional on month of the year, is then calculated for each month.
The results are shown in table 4, which repeats table 2, but with a line for RTPHedged. The effect of hedging is quite strong: On average, this simple hedging plan removes about 90% of the unanticipated bill volatility that would otherwise occur as a result of changing from TOU-F to RTP. Table 5 repeats table 3 , but with a line for RTPHedged. Measuring now the coefficient of maximum deviation, hedging again removes most of the volatility due to RTP. On average RTP-H eliminates more than 80% of the additional volatility that would otherwise occur under RTP. These effects are also present with pricing scenarios II and III, the results for which are shown in the appendix. Under all three pricing scenarios, hedging eliminates the vast majority of volatility that would otherwise result from implementation of RTP.
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V. Bill Volatility with Variable Hedging
In the previous section, I assumed a naive hedging strategy and demonstrated that even such a simple approach could eliminate a great deal of the bill volatility that would be associated with real-time pricing. More granular hedging products and precise demand forecasts would further reduce the unanticipated volatility.
17 If the customer's goal is to minimize its bill volatility, however, there is additional value in considering the correlation between its own unanticipated high demand and high electricity prices.
There is an intuition, often expressed by large electricity customers, that a customer is at increased risk of high bills if the its demand is positively correlated with price. This is more than a theoretical concern for a customer that, for instance, runs its air conditioners hardest on the hottest days of the year when prices are also likely to be highest.
A simple example demonstrates both that this intuition is correct and that this correlation can make hedging especially valuable. Consider the examples in table 6. A customer consumes a quantity of either 4 or 6 with equal probability. The market price is either 8 or 12, also with equal probability. In example A, the customer's consumption is uncorrelated with the system price. A bit of arithmetic reveals that the customer's expected bill is 50 with a standard deviation of 14.28. An actuarially fair hedge contract in this market would sell for 10, the expected price. Assume that the customer purchases aq = 5 unit hedge, equal to its expected demand, for a price of p = 10 before either its demand or the market price is revealed. If its demand turns out to be 6, it will buy one additional unit on the spot market, and if its demand turns out to be 4, it will sell the extra unit on the spot market. A bit more arithmetic shows that the expected bill is still 50, but now with a standard deviation of 10.20. In fact, it is straightforward to show that a hedge ofq = 5 minimizes the standard deviation of the distribution of possible bills. Now consider example B in which the prices and customer's quantity each have the same distribution as in A, but are now perfectly correlated with one another. Either the optimal hedging for a risk-averse farmer trying to stabilize income when price and his crop yield are negatively correlated. He shows that "the more highly negatively correlated are price and output the smaller will be the optimal forward sale." More generally, he derives the optimal hedge position asq *
where cv(q) and cv(p) are the coefficients of variation of quantity and price, respectively, and ρ is the correlation between the price and the firm's quantity. Equation [1] implies that 100% hedging is optimal when price and quantity are uncorrelated, ρ = 0. When ρ is positive, optimal hedging will be greater than 100% and the degree to which it increases is an increasing function of the variability of the firm's q and a decreasing function of the variability of the market p. Likewise, if ρ < 0, the optimal hedge is less than 100% and by a greater amount as the variability of q increases relative to the variability of p. Defining "optimal hedging" for a customer as the level of hedging that minimizes its bill coefficient of deviation, the bars in figure 1 show the distribution of optimal hedge levels for the 1142 customers. About 77% of all customers are best off with some amount of over-hedging, i.e., a hedge level above 100% of their average consumption for each hedge period. With every customer hedging optimally, the average coefficient of deviation drops to 0.147, down from 0.187 that resulted when all customers hedged 100% of their average consumption. In fact, unexpected bill volatility is lower on average under RTP with optimal hedging than it is under even a flat-rate tariff. The three lines in figure 1 show the average coefficient of deviation for customers in each of the hedging bins under three different billing arrangements. The difference between the "100% hedged" line and the "optimal hedge" line shows that the reduction in volatility for RTP customers can be quite substantial for those customers with optimal hedge positions that are far from 100%.
Comparing the "optimal hedge" to the "TOU-F" line illustrates that optimally hedged RTP customers of all types have bill volatility at least as low as under the fixed-ratio TOU tariff they currently face. This somewhat more sophisticated hedging strategy reduces the highest bills for most customers to about the same level they now face under TOU-F.
While this analysis suggests that variable hedging may be important in reducing customer bill risk, it likely overstates the potential benefits, because it considers the effect of the optimal ex-post hedging strategy for each customer. In reality, customers will not know ex ante exactly how much hedging will be optimal for their future demand pattern.
Their ex ante choices will necessarily be suboptimal on average. Still, variable hedging with even imperfect information would almost certainly be an improvement over naive hedging of 100% of a customer's expected demand. Further research into methods for ex ante determination of (constrained) optimal hedging levels is likely to be valuable.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that electricity bills are a small part of costs for most commercial and industrial customers, there is a great deal of concern with the volatility of this cost component. Such concerns have prompted some large customers to oppose real-time pricing on the grounds that it could increase the risk they face from volatility in their monthly bills.
I have shown that RTP without hedging could indeed substantially increase customer bill volatility, potentially leading to bills that in some months are double or triple the level that the customer would normally expect. That increased bill risk, however, can be almost entirely eliminated through use of simple forward purchase contracts that hedge price risk 20 for a fixed quantity of power. I've demonstrated that the simple strategy of a customer buying its expected demand quantity through a forward purchase contract eliminates more than 80% of the additional bill volatility.
I then consider a somewhat more sophisticated approach to hedging, recognizing that the optimal amount of hedging for a customer will depend on the correlation between its demand and the real-time price. Because most customers exhibit a positive correlation, it is optimal for most to over-hedge, i.e., purchase forward more than 100% of their expected demand. Among customers in the sample, the optimal level of hedging varies considerably;
for some, less that 100% hedging would have minimized bill volatility. I show that optimal hedging would have substantially reduced bill volatility compared to 100% hedging for many customers. On average, optimal hedging even reduced bill volatility below the level customers face on conventional TOU tariffs. Ex post optimal hedging is probably not achievable, but this suggests that it would be worthwhile to explore further approaches to determining ex ante a customer's best hedging strategy based on limited information.
I have not considered the implications of variable hedging for the forward market.
While it seems likely that sellers would also be interested in stabilizing their revenuesso would be interested in selling significant quantities forward -it is not clear that the demand for over-hedging that this analysis suggests would be met by an equally willing supply of over-hedging without a significant premium. In fact, to the extent that producers are subject to random outages and that they occur more frequently when prices are high,
McKinnon's analysis suggests that they might want to hedge less than 100% of their expected output. Bessembinder & Lemon (2002) suggest that if only risk-averse industry participants trade in a forward market for electricity, an equilibrium risk premium will result that will be negative during low-demand/low-volatility times and positive during high-demand/high-volatility times. This would, of course, leave speculative opportunities that have positive net present value. Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel, and Wolfram (2004) find significant forward premia/discounts in the California electricity market, but argue that they could not plausibly be attributable to risk aversion. Whether entry from other financial participants, which has occurred to some extent in electricity, would be sufficient to drive forward prices to expected spot price levels is an open question.
I also have not yet analyzed the role that option contracts could have in addressing bill volatility. It might at first appear that a call option contract would eliminate all bill volatility for the buyer that is due to price fluctuations, because it gives the option to buy (or not) at a fixed price. This intuition, however, is not accurate. A financial option yields positive returns whenever the market price is above the strike price, regardless of the demand of the customer holding the option at that particular time. So, profit-maximizing exercise of options would not eliminate bill volatility (net of profits from holding the option). It is not clear to me at this point the degree to which the contingent payoff structure of option contracts would help to mitigate bill volatility. 
